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According to the Seveso Directives, the risk assessment is crucial for an effective control of major accident 
hazard. Nevertheless, the complexity of many Seveso sites, due to human, technical and organizational 
factors makes recognized common practices limited because of their intrinsic static nature. In this paper, a 
dynamic approach for risk assessment is proposed, which allows evaluating moment by moment the state of 
the system under analysis by Bayesian belief networks. A petrochemical coastal storage was selected as 
applicative case-study to verify the capability of the dynamic approach. Network training is performed by 
entering historical reliability data, near-miss and accidents data series collected on-site by periodical 
inspection plans on critical elements, as well as from the evidences of SMS reports. Upon proper refinement 
and further validation with reliable field data, the predictive approach may be used as a management decision-
making tool. 
1. Introduction 
As many other contexts, risk analysis has been strongly affected by the big data era, that means by the ability 
to provide continuous acquisition, effective process and meaningful communication of such information. This 
amount of data is particularly interesting in managing risk and asset integrity of process plants. Research in 
this context is faced with the dilemma that, while there have been significant developments in understanding 
how accidents occur, there has been no comparable development in understanding how to adequately assess 
and reduce risks (Bouloiz et al., 2013), considering both process and personnel side of safety (Fabiano et al., 
1995). In process safety and risk management area, a need for an integrated and holistic system approach 
has been explicitly described and advanced research trends include knowledge-based methods combined 
with process models, such as Petri nets, signed digraphs, and dynamic simulation (Jain et al., 2018). The 
application of BN in the field of risk and reliability was explored by many researchers, e.g. Abbasi et al., 2016. 
A system is safe if it is impervious and resilient to perturbations, thus the identification and assessment of 
relevant hazards is an essential prerequisite for system safety. Nevertheless, traditional methods for risk 
assessment do not take into account interactions between system components and do not adequately 
address human and organizational factors, thus being not appropriate for complex systems (Leveson, 2004). 
Some efforts have been made to include human and organizational factors (Milazzo et al., 2010), while few 
works attempt to integrate organizational and human factors in a dynamic approach. As examples based on 
Bayesian theory, Kalantarnia et al. (2009), proposed a method for dynamic safety management and Meel & 
Seider (2006) estimated the dynamic probabilities of accident sequences having different severity levels by 
using statistical analyses of near-miss and incidents. In this work, a dynamic approach for risk assessment, 
based on the evaluation of the state of the system under analysis, is outlined to be applied for those cases 
when a static assessment method is not trustable. The Bayesian networks are constructed from Fault Trees 
Analyses (FTA) and failure rates represents a priori probabilities. The modelling provides a set of independent 
nodes (root elements of FTA, i.e. critical items) and intermediate events for the top event. The network training 
is performed by using historical reliability data, near-miss and accidents data collected on-site by periodical 
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inspection plans on critical elements. The remainder of this paper is as follows: Section 2, outlines the 
background and covers the methodology; Section 3 describes the Seveso upper tier costal storage, selected 
for its complexity and the environmental sensitivity of the site, with main hazards connected to possible spill 
and fire scenarios following HC/chemicals major LOCs (Palazzi et al., 2012). Results obtained by the 
framework, including sensitivity analysis, are discussed in Section 4, followed by concluding remarks in 
Section 5.  
2. Bayesian belief networks  
When implementing a critical safety application, it is essential to be able to present the argument that it meets, 
i.e. the system requirements, in terms of availability and reliability, and how often it returns a response and 
how often such a response is correct. Typically, this argument is supported by a combination of (i) hard and 
soft evidence and (ii) a priori and a posteriori evidence. BBNs provide a tool for incorporating these types of 
evidence and providing quantitative results, e.g. to model alarm management (Wang et al., 2018). Fault Tree 
Analyses (FTA) encapsulate the concept that the failure of a (sub)system can be caused by the failure of 
lower-level (sub)systems, so that the minimal cut sets can be identified. Given a FTA, failure rates and failure 
distributions can be associated with each leaf in a BBN and then consolidated into a failure rate and failure 
distribution for an entire system. In practice, quantifying leaf failures for an entire system is difficult or, in many 
cases, impossible. Bayesian networks allow the quantification by accepting evidence for the failure rate of any 
node and, then, using Bayes' theorem to calculate the a posteriori probabilities of the failure rates of the sub-
elements. API recommended practice (API 581, 2016) uses Bayes’ theorem to update the prior knowledge of 
the failure rate λ with the information gained during an inspection. λ is not considered as a single value 
variable, but as a random variable expressed in the form of a probability density function (pdf). Then a 
posterior pdf given E is determined, which is the newly observed evidence. This posterior distribution can be 
derived from the product of a prior distribution of failure rate values, f(λ), and the new information as a 
likelihood function, L(E|λ): 
݂	(ߣ|ܧ) = ݂(ߣ)ܮ(ܧ|ߣ)׬ ݂(ߣ)ܮ(ܧ|ߣ)݀ߣஶ଴
 (1) 
The likelihood function represents the probability that E is observed given a value of λ.  With little information 
to start with as a prior distribution, a uniform distribution can be assumed, while for a likelihood function, in 
case of a constant failure rate, a Poisson distribution is suited. 
3. The coastal storage facility 
Seveso II Directive produced a growth of interest in the field of environmental risk assessment from a 
legislative point of view, with a specific classification of dangerous substances (Sikorova et al.,2017). As 
demonstrated by recent statistical analysis on process accidents hazardous releases still represent a serious 
concern in the petrochemical industries notwithstanding the available accurate modelling techniques and the 
achievement of acceptable preventive risk limits (Fabiano et al., 2018). Storage siting in coastal areas 
implying possible sea environment contamination in case of accidental oil spill (Palazzi et al., 2004) evidences 
the need for reliable accident forecasting, accurate consequence assessment and effective emergency 
management plans. The coastal storage facility is a Seveso upper tier terminal consisting of a quay (the 
Western Dock) and four piers (Alfa, Beta, Gamma and Delta), where loading/unloading operations of 
hazardous products take place according to typology, berths availability and tanker characteristics, as follows. 
For oil products: 
• load arms installed on the Beta, Gamma and Delta berths, which connect the ship with the pipes that run 
on the pier (dock line); the arms are equipped with two safety systems: (i) automatic closing of the "double 
valve" devices, to segregate the flow of product moved on the ship and on the ground side in case of 
emergency; (ii) sectioning of the "double valve" in the event of abandonment of the ship's mooring, which 
prevents the product from escaping. Therefore, if a ship has to move away in an emergency, the system 
automatically closes the "double valve" and disconnects the arm preventing avoiding releases;  
• the pier lines that engage in a complex system of pipes and allow different interchanges based on the 
dock, the product to be moved and the product’s destination; 
• the collector pit lines that actually connect the pontoon lines with the booster stations of the user 
companies and with the manifold area of another company; 
• booster stations that send products to factories or warehouses located inland through relaunch pumps and 
oil pipelines. 
For chemical products: 
830
• the hoses installed on the Western Dock, which connect the ship with the pipes that run on the quay; 
• the lines of the quay that are grafted, from each approach, in the relative line that runs in collector pit; 
• collector pit lines directly connected to deposits located outside the terminal. 
The industrial activity involves only handling and storage without any processing. Handling takes place at 
room temperature (with the exception of the fuel oil that can be heated up to a maximum temperature of 60°C) 
and at the pressure supplied by the on-board pumps and by the the pumps of the coastal storage deposit. 
4. FTA development and risk assessment 
4.1 Conventional approach 
The top events presented in this work are the following: 
1. Leakage of petroleum products or crude oil into collectors during the loading/unloading ship can be 
connected to the following immediate causes: significant loss or catastrophic breakage of the pipes used 
for handling petroleum products and crude oil (pipe sections passing through the collector pit); leakage 
from valves/flanges. 
2. Leaking from the vapor recovery system and losses from components can occur both under random 
conditions and due to overpressures due to maneuvering errors on board (e.g. failure to open the valve 
of a tank during loading). However, it should be emphasized that the lines used for handling crude oil 
and diesel oil are protected by overpressure with safety valves set at 14 bar in the form of an 
underground tank located near the DISCOIL. 
3. Product losses along the piers can be connected to one of the following immediate causes: significant 
loss of containment, or catastrophic breakage of the pipes used for handling oil and crude products 
(sections of pipes passing along the piers); loss from valves/flanges; leakage from the vapor recovery 
unit (VRU); loss from the loading arms. 
Table 1 summarizes the basic failure rates adopted for this study (Cremer & Warner, 1982; TNO, 1999). 
 
 (a) b) 
Figure 1: FTA (a) Oil/chemicals leak into collector pits; (b) Leak from vapour recovery system (VRU) 
 
Figure 2: FTA Oil/chemical leak on piers 
Results of FTA for the considered loss of containment scenarios are summarized in Figures 1 and 2. 
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Table 1: Basic events probability of failures (leak in the collector pits or leak on piers and VRU) 
Basic event Failure rate  Failure probability  
Collector pit   
Valve full rupture, (chemicals) 8E-06 0.0034 
Valve full rupture, (oil) 8E-06 0.0033 
Significant pipeline LOC (chemicals) 3E-05 0.015 
Significant pipeline LOC (oil) 3E-05 0.02 
Piers and VRU   
Significant pipeline LOC (chemicals) 3E-05 0.023 
Significant pipeline LOC (oil) 3E-05 0.011 
Valve full rupture, (chemicals) 8E-06 0.0011 
Valve full rupture, (oil) 8E-06 0.00056 
Loading arms catastrophic rupture (chemicals) 3E-06 0.0058  
Loading arms catastrophic rupture (oil) 3E-06 0.0055 
Operative error or omission  5E-01 34 
Incorrect hose connection 4E-04 0.65 
4.2 The Bayesian approach 
BBN can be seen as a natural extension of FTA, which allows incorporating local dependence between events 
and enabling both predictive and inference analysis. BBN approaches require specifying exact prior 
probabilities for each elementary event and conditional probabilities for every dependency. Under the working 
hypothesis of elementary event independency, it is mandatory to elicit a prior distribution for each elementary 
event, then to use simulations for the derivation of the prior distributions for intermediate events and the Top 
Event, and finally to find posterior distributions using priority sampling. Starting from the above-mentioned fault 
trees, the following Bayesian networks have been constructed, in which the failure rates of the trees represent 
the a priori probabilities. The basic networks are shown in Figure 3 a-b-c. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a)      (b) 
 (c) 
Figure 3: BNs (a) Oil/chemicals leak into collector pits; (b) Leak from VRU; (c) Oil/chemicals leak on piers 
Sensitivity analysis can be empirically performed by altering each of the parameters of the query nodes and 
observing the consequent variation in the posterior probabilities of the query node (such as the endpoint). 
Tables 2-3 show the results of networks analysis performed by MCMC (Markov Chain Monte Carlo) sampling, 
evidencing the sensitivity of the Top Event nodes to findings in the other nodes and suggesting the possibility 
of setting up key management priorities, upon further validation with significant field data information.   
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Table 2: Sensitivity of “Leak in the collector pits”' to a finding at another node 
Node Variance reduction Percent Mutual info Percent Beliefs variance  
Collector pit 0.001039 100 0.01180 100 0.0010385 
Valves / flanges 0.0006889 66.3 0.00728 61.7 0.0006889 
Oil valves / flanges 0.0003494 33.6 0.00356 30.2 0.0003494 
Pipelines 0.0003494 33.6 0.00356 30.2 0.0003494 
Chemicals valves / flanges 0.0003394 32.7 0.00346 29.3 0.0003394 
Oil pipelines 0.0001996 19.2 0.00201 17 0.0001996 
Chemicals pipelines 0.0001497 14.4 0.00150 12.7 0.0001497 
Table 3: Sensitivity of “Leak on piers” to a finding at another node 
Node Variance reduction Percent Mutual info Percent Beliefs 
variance  
Piers 0.004058 100 0.03821 100 0.0040576 
VRU 0.001988 49 0.01674 43.8 0.0019877 
Loading arms 0.001092 26.9 0.00897 23.5 0.0010920 
Valves / flanges 0.0006451 15.9 0.00524 13.7 0.0006451 
Chemicals loading arms 0.0005458 13.5 0.00442 11.6 0.0005458 
Oil loading arms 0.0005458 13.5 0.00442 11.6 0.0005458 
Oil valves / flanges 0.0004962 12.2 0.00402 10.5 0.0004962 
Pipelines 0.0003274 8.07 0.00264 6.91 0.0003274 
Chemicals pipelines 0.0002282 5.62 0.00184 4.8 0.0002282 
Chemicals valves / flanges 0.0001488 3.67 0.00119 3.13 0.0001488 
Oil pipelines 9.92e-05 2.44 0.00080 2.08 0.0000992 
4.3 Introducing evidences 
The networks are then updated, on one hand, with the reliability parameters (results of the inspections or 
failures on demand - hard evidences) and, on the other one, with the evidences of the ongoing activities, 
which represent the likelihood coefficients (soft evidences). By considering a product transfer lasting nearly 
ten hours, soft evidence included, among others, the absence/presence of failures or losses in the early hours 
of the operation, which are the most critical. These evidences increase the likelihood coefficient related to the 
absence/presence of failures during the operation. Other evidences are, for instance, the absence/presence of 
failures, or malfunctions, at the start of VRU, or the absence of human error during the operations. 
From this, the trend of the probability of occurrence of the top events can be obtained, in relation to what is 
happening in the plant when introducing “good” evidences (Figure 4), “bad” evidences (Figure 5), or “bad” 
evidences taking into account designed preventive actions (Figure 6). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: "Good" evidences: trend of the posterior probability of leakage in the collectors pit and on piers 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: "Bad" evidences: trend of the posterior probability of leakage in the collectors pit and on piers 
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Figure 6: "Bad" evidences with corrective measures: trend of the posterior probability of given leakages 
5. Conclusions 
BBNs are a robust and flexible method for modeling complex systems that allows incorporating quantitatively 
into the safety analysis both hard and soft evidence. The prediction of variable influences and the analysis of 
variables dependence strength permits identifying which, among the basic failures, are the most influencing on 
the probability of the top events. The true probability of failure on demand of a component is of paramount 
importance for reliance on safeguards and addresses maintenance priorities. Additionally, the relationship 
between the risk trend represented as a probability function and the evidences during the operation in 
progress is analyzed. The framework may represent a tool allowing to manage in a real-time mode the 
operations with a focus on safety and combined with proper advanced analytics applications allows 
anticipating what should be done to avoid upcoming incidents. 
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